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  In searching for infrastructure-financing options, local governments can look 
to their balance sheets as well as their budgets.  Municipalities often have a wide 
array of assets on their balance sheets, ranging from infrastructure networks to public 
buildings, from housing to municipally owned enterprises, as well as municipally 
owned land.  Active asset management involves deciding what to do with these 
assets.  Should they be held and operated in their present form?  Should they be re-
priced so that users pay true economic costs?  Or should a municipality sell some 




  Asset sales have some attraction as a way to mobilize investment resources.  
From a local perspective, local governments often have more flexibility in managing 
their assets than they do in adjusting tax rates, introducing new taxes, increasing user 
fees, or borrowing funds for investment—all of which may require higher-level 
governmental approval or be prohibited altogether by the intergovernmental fiscal 
framework.  From the perspective of macro fiscal management, if local governments 
truly are disposing of assets tangential to their core mission, and using the proceeds 
to invest in basic infrastructure, this tightening of governmental focus without 
incurring debt is to be applauded. 
 
  Local governments, of course, have recognized the possibility of financing 
infrastructure investment through asset sales.  For a period in the mid-1990s, the City 
of Bratislava, Slovakia, for example financed roughly 15% of its annual capital 
budget from privatization proceeds.  As a general rule, however, asset sales of this 
kind have been viewed as a temporary financing expedient, made possible by 
government’s decision to exit certain activities like provision of public housing or 
operation of economic enterprises that compete with the private sector.  Fiscal 
experts have warned cities not to become dependent upon asset sales as a significant 
or continuing source of capital financing. 
 
  Sale of municipally owned land may be a partial exception, in that it can 
sustain infrastructure finance for a longer period of time.  In countries where all 
urban land is owned by the public sector, land is by far the most valuable asset on the 
municipal balance sheet.  It often is the most valuable municipal asset under other 
landholding regimes.  Urban land values are created in part by public investment. 
They reflect the capitalized value of access to road networks, water supply, schools 
and other services made possible by municipal investment.  It is economically 
appropriate therefore for municipalities to capture part of the land-value increment 
they create through their investment.  There are various ways that increases in urban 
land values can be captured, but the sale of land or land rights has the advantage of 
                                                           
2  For the role of balance sheet and asset management in municipal finance, see Peterson (2006).   3
producing revenue quickly and being easier to administer than betterment taxes, land 
re-adjustment schemes, or universal property taxation.  
 
  Moreover, municipally owned urban land is not a static asset.  It can be 
‘created’ by expanding the urban area into rural zones at the urban fringe.  A legally 
empowered, active asset manager can also acquire additional land from current users 
for urban re-development, or for highway and airport construction.  It can then re-sell 
part of the land after its value has been enhanced by public investment.  Even 
without public improvements, urbanization and economic growth tend to drive up 
land prices, adding to the value of land held on local balance sheets, and raising the 
question of whether the municipal asset base would be more effectively deployed if 
some of the landholdings were exchanged for infrastructure. 
 
  This chapter examines the potential of land sales as an infrastructure-
financing tool.  The first section looks at the land leasing process and its 
implementation in China, which has made the largest-scale commitment to 
converting land assets into infrastructure.  Many cities in China have financed half or 
more of their very high urban infrastructure investment levels directly from land 
leasing, while borrowing against the value of land on their balance sheets to finance 
much of the remainder.  The second section places China’s experience in 
perspective, by looking briefly at Hong Kong, from which mainland China adapted 
its land leasing framework, Ethiopia, a country at the other end of the prosperity 
spectrum that recently introduced land-leasing as a financing device for cities, and 
India. Land in India is not generally owned by the public sector, but the urban 
development authorities that have responsibility for much of urban infrastructure 
investment often have extensive landholdings as do other governmental institutions.  
These institutions have begun to turn to land development and land sales as an 
infrastructure financing strategy.  In all of these countries, land sales either are 
financing, or have the potential for financing, a surprisingly large share of urban 
infrastructure investment. 
 
  The final section weighs the policy issues and risks associated with land sales 
on this scale.  Monetizing publicly held land may, for a period, generate an abundant 
source of revenue for local governments, but it also introduces a new set of risks that 
can profoundly affect fiscal management.  In fact, as more countries are tempted to 
take advantage of the boom in urban land values to finance local budgets, the type of 
prudential restrictions built into fiscal responsibility laws may have to be broadened 
to deal with these risks. 
 
   4
II. LAND LEASING AND URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE:  
THE CASE OF CHINA 
 
  Land leasing in China involves the up-front sale of long-term occupancy and 
development rights. The practice was introduced on an experimental basis in 1987 in 
Shenzhen and other coastal cities, as part of the de facto decentralization of China’s 
fiscal system.  Up to that time, public authorities allocated land administratively and 
land use was free.  The land-leasing reforms were intended in part to stimulate 
locally led economic development, by allowing cities to attract foreign investment by 
providing stable land occupancy rights to investors.  From the start, land leasing was 
tied to infrastructure investment.  Land leasing provided a potentially large source of 
income, whose revenues were to be invested primarily in infrastructure systems, 
further enhancing cities’ competitive position for economic growth.   
 
  In 1988, China’s constitution, which previously had prohibited all types of 
land transfer, was amended to permit land leasing while retaining public ownership 
of land.  In 1990, the State Council formally affirmed land leasing as public policy.  
By 1992, Shanghai and Beijing had adopted land leasing as local practice, and it 
began to spread.
3  Like most of China’s economic development and fiscal reforms, 
the wave of land leasing moved from coastal experimental cities to Shanghai and the 
capital, then westward to the rest of the country. 
 
  Land leasing has been a key element of China’s fiscal decentralization   In 
China, the central government retains all tax policy authority over local 
governments.  Municipalities cannot change tax rates, introduce new taxes of their 
own design, or scrap dysfunctional local taxes.  They need higher-level 
governmental approval for adjustments in user charges.  As initiated in Shenzhen and 
applied elsewhere, land leasing was an attempt by municipalities to gain control over 
a revenue source genuinely within their control.  Until very recently municipal 
governments have been free to assemble and sell land at their discretion, constrained 
only by the expansion of urban boundaries approved in their master plans. 
 
Whereas China’s 1994 fiscal framework reforms (see Chapter 2) have been 
described as a form of fiscal re-centralization, due to the increase in central 
government’s share of shared taxes, revenue-sharing arrangements for land leasing 
moved in the opposite direction. Originally, the central government’s share of land-
leasing revenues was set at 60 percent.  The split subsequently was modified to 40:60 
for central and local governments, respectively, then to 32:68 and 5:95, before all 
land-leasing revenues were assigned to municipal governments as part of the 1994 
                                                           
3 The speed with which land leasing was adopted can be seen from Shanghai’s records.  Between 
1988 and 1991, 12 land leases were granted in Shanghai.  The total rose to 201 in 1992 and 3,000 in 
1993.  (Fu, 1996)   5
fiscal reforms (Chan 1997).
4  Much of the emphasis that cities place on land leasing 
in China’s competitive federalism framework stems from the fact that fiscal rules 
allow them to keep the land-leasing revenues that they mobilize and grant 
municipalities a great deal of freedom to act as entrepreneurs in the local land 
market. 
 
  The purchaser of a land lease acquires land rights for a period of 40 to 70 
years, depending upon the type of property development.  Land that is ‘sold’ and 
approved for development can be reclaimed by government if not developed within a 
specified time period.  Originally, municipalities transferred land rights to developers 
primarily by private negotiation.  In the mid-1990s, a review by the Ministry of Land 
and Resources found that more than 95 percent of all transfers had taken this form. 
(Sun, 1995) Private negotiations with developers, however, provided a fertile ground 
for corruption, with consequent revenue loss to government.  In 2002 central 
authorities promulgated a new circular instructing municipalities to conduct all land 
leasing through public bidding at auction.  Municipalities were slow to accept the 
new limitations (Beijing issued its order to conduct all municipal land transfers 
through public competition only in 2004).  However, according to central statistics, 
the percentage of municipal land transfers occurring through auction or public 
bidding rose from 15 percent in 2002 to 33 percent in 2003 (China Daily, 2004b), 
and has continued to rise, becoming the primary form of conveyance in economically 
advanced cities.   
 
Revenue Generated from Land Sales 
 
Because comprehensive municipal budgets are not released to the public, it is 
difficult to put together reliable data on the magnitude of land leasing except through 
case studies.  Table 1 summarizes information from several different case studies 
regarding land-leasing revenues and their size relative to total local spending or the 
local capital budget.  Although land leasing is viewed as an infrastructure-financing 
tool by Chinese municipalities, there is no legal requirement to dedicate revenues to 






                                                           
4 The decision to assign all revenue from land leasing to municipalities in part recognized on-the-
ground reality.  The State Auditing Authority found that in 1991 and 1992, 80% of the land leasing 
revenues generated by sample municipalities were concealed from the local fiscal authority, and of the 
amount received by the fiscal authority 90% was assigned to the local discretionary budget rather than 
shared with central government according to the rules then in effect.    6
Table 1 






Period Revenue  Raised
a 
Shanghai
b  1992-2004  More than RMB 100 billion, 
used for capital spending 
Shenzhen
c  Throughout 1990s  Approximately 80% of 
total local government revenues 
Beijing
d  1995-96 RMB  6.9  billion 





2002-2003 RMB  4.7  billion 





2002 RMB  6  billion 
(more than 20% of total government 
revenues) 
Guangdong Province  1992  RMB 9.4 billion 
(45% of total revenue of provincial 
government and municipalities) 
a   RMB 8.0 = US$1.00 
b   Guo (chapter x, this volume) 
c   Chan (1997) 
d   Deng (2003) 
e   Author’s interviews.  Chengdu is capital of Sichuan Province 
f    Ding (2005) Hangzhou is capital of Zhejiang Province 
g   Sun (1995) 
 
 
The studies underlying these data suggest that direct revenues from land 
leasing can generate a substantial part of the municipal capital budget for a period of 
10 to 15 years, even when investment levels are as high as they have been in China.  
Urban land values in China have risen at a frantic pace.  The potential for revenue 
mobilization is indicated by two individual land-auction transactions consummated 
in Shanghai, one at the end of 2005, the other in January 2006.   Sale of lease rights 
to two land plots in downtown Shanghai generated more than RMB 6.5 billion 
(roughly US$810 million), with leasing rights selling at US$9,300 per square meter 
in one transaction and US$7,500 in the other. As an indication of the volume of land 
leasing, Shanghai in the third quarter of 2003 leased at auction 805 hectares (8.05 
million square meters) of land, mostly in the new development area of Pudong.  The 
real estate boom has spread to western China.  Chengdu, capital of Sichuan province, 
sold a single mixed commercial/residential site outside the central zone for the 
equivalent of US$97 million, or roughly $1,350 per square meter.  The municipality   7
has been actively auctioning large blocks of land in new development zones in order 
to finance its ambitious infrastructure program. 
 
The role of publicly owned land in urban infrastructure finance extends well 
beyond direct proceeds from land-leasing sales.  Borrowing from state-owned 
commercial and development banks has financed much of the remaining urban 
infrastructure investment.  This borrowing takes the form of balance-sheet debt 
typically secured by municipally owned land.  Debt service often is paid by selling 
off the leasing rights to parcels of land whose value has been enhanced by the debt-
financed infrastructure projects.   
 
    The interaction between land leasing, debt and infrastructure investment is 
illustrated by the construction of the outer-ring circumferential highway in 
Changsha, capital of Hunan Province in central China.  To finance the project, the 
municipality transferred to a public-private agency, the Ring Road Investment 
Corporation, leasing rights for strips of land 200 meters wide on both sides of the 
highway that was to be built, totaling 33 square kilometers of land in all, of which 12 
square kilometers was finished land possessing infrastructure access and 
development approvals.  In its original state, without access to roads or 
infrastructure, the remaining land had very little market value.  However, the plan 
was to sell off land parcels once the highway was built.  The total cost of the second 
stage of the highway project was estimated at RMB 6 billion (at the time some 
US$730 million).  Approximately half of this amount was financed directly from sale 
of leasing rights to the land already having infrastructure service.  The other half was 
financed through borrowing.  The Ring Road Investment Corporation was able to 
borrow against the future anticipated value of the improved land to obtain financing 
from China Development Bank and commercial banks, pledging to sell off land 
parcels in the future, after the highway was completed, to meet debt service.   
 
  Cities as Land Entrepreneurs 
 
  The importance of land-leasing revenues to cities’ fiscal capacity and 
infrastructure investment has turned municipal governments into land-market 
entrepreneurs.  Municipalities try to acquire as much land as possible, as cheaply as 
possible, then either sell it at market rates, use it as collateral for infrastructure loans, 
or provide it at below-market rates to strategic (mostly foreign) investors for 
industrial development. 
 
  Municipalities acquire land in various ways.  They can move municipal state- 
owned enterprises (SOEs) from central locations to the urban outskirts, where the 
companies have better transportation access but land is cheaper, then and sell the 
vacated land to developers.  This re-location is part of a broad rationalization of land   8
use created by land pricing.  In the first years of land leasing, before the regulatory 
framework was clarified, SOEs tried to capture all the proceeds of land leasing sales 
for themselves through direct transactions with developers.  Municipalities fought 
successfully for control of the supply of land-leasing rights and land revenues.  Such 
transactions must now proceed through the municipal Land Resource Center, subject 
to municipal decision-making, and with the municipal government receiving a 
prescribed share of sales revenue. 
 
Municipalities can expand the urbanized area by acquiring land from rural 
communes and converting it to urban use.  The municipality’s sale price for leasing 
land for urban use has vastly exceeded the purchase price it pays farmers, often by a 
factor as large as 100 times.
5  The scramble by municipalities to acquire land for 
urbanization—dubbed China’s version of the “enclosure movement”—has led 
municipalities to stockpile land by taking advantage of (and abusing) exceptions to 
urban land-use limitations in their authorized development plans.  One exception 
involves land acquired for approved economic development zones and industrial 
parks.  The Ministry of Land and Resources found in 2004 that 6,015 development 
zones had been established by municipalities, of which only 1,251 had received the 
requisite approval of the State Council or provincial governments.  In total, these 
municipalities had declared development zones and industrial parks covering an 
astounding 35,400 square kilometers of formerly rural land, most of which was 
serving as a land reserve for potential future development and municipal land 
leasing. (China Daily 2004b) 
 
A municipality or its development agency also can designate centrally 
located areas of rundown housing or small-scale businesses for re-development and 
acquire land from traditional users under a plan that involves mandatory re-
settlement.  The municipality upgrades infrastructure, then sells land-leasing rights 
for re-development. 
 
  Perhaps the most novel form of freeing up land for re-sale involves moving 
city hall and all of the municipality’s administrative buildings to a new location, 
outside the urban center, then auctioning off the vacated central land to developers.  
As a strategy for generating land-leasing revenues and infrastructure investment, this 
approach has twin advantages.  It creates a new urban center where municipal offices 
re-locate, enhancing the value of surrounding land, which the municipality can lease, 
while it frees up for competitive leasing and commercial re-development very highly 
valued land at the existing urban center.  All six of the municipalities examined in 
                                                           
5 The minimum price that municipalities have to pay for rural land has been calculated as a multiple of 
a commune’s actual annual income from agriculture, not “market” value.  In reality, there is no land 
market for farmers since they cannot own or lease land individually and the commune cannot sell 
land-use rights directly to developers or others.     9
the World Bank’s City Development Strategies II program had either moved their 
city hall and administrative offices in this way, or were in the process of doing so. 
(Chreod 2005) 
 
  In this type of land market activity, municipalities act as an aggressive, 
profit-maximizing monopolist.  Local officials have formalized strategic guidelines 
as to how municipal governments should seek to gain control over all land leasing 
transactions, so as to control the volume and location of land supply and maximize 
municipal revenues.
6  Municipalities are required to compensate land users who are 
re-settled with cash and alternative housing. Analysis of the pattern of land leasing in 
Shanghai demonstrates that the areas leased for commercial development tended to 
maximize net leasing revenues, after compensation costs, confirming the 
entrepreneurial mindset of the municipality. (Fu, Somerville, Gu and Huang, 1999). 
 
Despite municipalities ’ability to create new supplies of urban land, land 
leasing is a transitional infrastructure-financing strategy.  The supply of land 
available for leasing eventually will run out.  Shenzhen, the pioneer in land leasing, 
aggressively expanded its urban boundaries for 15 years.  By now, the potential for 
further expansion or new land leasing has almost been exhausted.  Shenzhen’s asset 
management company, in fact, has turned to buying and selling land-use rights in 
other urban areas of the interior of China as a way of continuing to use its 
entrepreneurial skills to generate revenues from land transactions.  By contrast, land 
leasing as an infrastructure-financing tool is gathering speed in later-developing 
regions of Western China and the rustbelt Northeast.  
 
In summary, China used land leasing as part of a strategy to jump-start urban 
infrastructure investment after decades of neglect.  The ‘marketization’ of land in 
effect, converted land that was generating no economic or financial return under the 
old landholding system into urban infrastructure that is the cornerstone of national 
economic growth.  Chinese authorities recognize that land leasing monetizes a finite 
asset and cannot indefinitely play such a prominent role in urban infrastructure 
finance.  As discussed by Guo (chapter x), the cities that pioneered land leasing are 
now shifting strategy to rely more on the income streams provided by infrastructure 
assets to recover capital costs. 
 
                                                           
6 For example, the Vice Mayor of Chengdu authored a volume (Sun Ping et al 2003) emphasizing that 
(i) land leasing and land supply should be the exclusive responsibility of government, (ii) therefore 
land transactions, including those by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the secondary market, should 
go through the municipality’s Land Resource Center or be approved by it, (iii) the municipality 
should capture for itself at least 60 percent of the net value gains resulting from the sale of leasing 
rights for land originally allocated to municipal SOEs, and (iv) land leasing proceeds should be used 
to finance municipal fixed-asset investment.   10
II.  LAND-LEASING AND LAND-SALE EXPERIENCE BEYOND 
CHINA 
 
China is a special case.  The nation has experienced exceptional economic 
growth driven by urbanization.  Its land-leasing system places land assets 
unambiguously in municipal governments’ hands and has not been tested by a 
significant economic downturn.   Is the financing capacity of land leasing and land 





  China drew its land-leasing model from Hong Kong, where it has been 
applied for more than a century and has been the underpinning of urban 
infrastructure investment.  Hong Kong’s experience bears out the ability of land 
leasing to generate large amounts of revenue over an extended period of time.  
Between 1970 and 2000 Hong Kong is estimated to have realized some US$71.1 
billion (in 2000 dollars) from up-front sale of land leases (Hong, 2003), including re-
negotiation at current market value of leases whose original term had expired--this 
for a jurisdiction with a population of approximately 6.8 million people. Most of the 
revenue traditionally has been used to pay for infrastructure investment and other 
public works, although there is no legal earmarking of land-sale proceeds. 
 
  Table 2 summarizes land-lease revenues and their relation to total public 
expenditure and expenditure on public works for the period 1996 to 2000.  Over this 
period, land leasing generated proceeds that exceeded Hong Kong’s total spending 
on infrastructure and other public works.  However, revenue collection from land 
leasing has been highly volatile, reflecting extreme volatility in the underlying land 
and property market.  Between 1990 and 1995, the average value per square foot of 
land leased at auction rose by a factor of more than four times in constant Hong 
Kong dollars.  With the arrival of the Asian financial crisis, and uncertainty about 
Hong Kong’s future economic role, land prices between 1998 and 2002 fell by 
almost 50 percent.  Land market demand declined so severely that Hong Kong 
suspended all sales of land for commercial development for more than three years.   
Over the period 2001-2003, revenues from land sales plummeted almost to zero, 
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Table 2 
Revenue from Land Leasing: 
  Hong Kong 
 
 
Land Leasing As % 
Of: 
1996  1997 1998 1999  2000  Average 
Expenditure 
On Public Works 
101%  229% 82% 133%  105%  130% 
Total  
Expenditure 
16%  34% 11% 18%  14% 18% 
Source:  Hong (2003) 
 
 
With recovery in the real estate market, Hong Kong has resumed land 
leasing, but changed its role from supplier of pre-announced amounts of land in 
locations designated for development by planners, to a more passive role intended to 
be consistent with market forces.  It adopted an Application List system, under which 
the government provides land only in response to developer requests at acceptable 
prices.  It was hoped that this change in procedure would also moderate the large 
swings in revenues, but to date revenue stabilization has been less than hoped for.  
Hong Kong in its Medium Range Forecast prepared in 2003 foresaw relatively stable 
revenues from leasing land assets, at 12-13% of annual total government revenue.  In 
the first year of the five-year planning period, 2004-05, actual revenue from land 
leasing substantially exceeded the target at HK$34 billion, but in the next fiscal year 
only HK$4 billion was realized. 
 
        The government has now convened a public consultative process preparatory to 
introducing a Goods and Services Tax, motivated in part by the desire to reduce 
exposure of the general budget to the high volatility of revenue resulting from land 
leasing.  This reform would allow land leasing to continue as a major contributor to 










                                                           
7 An IMF Mission in October 2005 emphasized the importance of broadening Hong Kong’s tax base.  
“A substantial part of non-tax revenues accrues from land sales and investment income that are very 
volatile.”  (IMF 2005)   12
Ethiopia 
 
  Ethiopia lies at the other end of the economic spectrum from China.  It has 
one of the lowest per capita income levels in the world, low levels of urbanization, 
and economic performance that fluctuates with rainfall.  Like some other African 
countries, Ethiopia recently has introduced land leasing into urban areas.
8 
 
  Land leasing has become an integral part of Ethiopia’s local decentralization 
efforts.  Economic rights to the income from land leasing have been assigned to 
municipalities.
9  Except for water tariffs, which some Regions now allow 
municipalities to adjust in light of service costs, land leasing is the only source of 
revenue over which municipalities have policy control.  All other sources of 
municipal revenue are laid out in Regional Proclamations dating back a decade or 
more, which specify the exact amounts that municipalities can levy for each of 
dozens of individual taxes and service fees. (Peterson 2005) 
  
Ethiopia does not require full up-front payment of the land-lease amount.  A 
portion of lease payment is due at contract signing.  The remainder can be paid over 
the lifetime of the lease agreement.  Interest may or may not be charged, depending 
upon the type of property involved and the Region that is implementing the federal 
land-leasing Proclamation.  Ethiopia is converting its land occupancy system from a 
previous regime where occupants “rent” land from the municipality on an annual 
basis, without formal legal protection of occupancy beyond the current year, to the 
“leasing” system, which is designed to give longer-term rights to land occupancy 
without surrendering public ownership. During the early years of the new system, 
much of leasing activity has been concentrated on vacant land, commercial 
properties, and property owners wanting to occupy plots greater than the maximum 
parcel size they are legally entitled to rent. 
 
Ethiopian policy attempts to tie land-leasing revenue directly to municipal 
infrastructure investment.  The federal land-leasing proclamation states that a 
municipality shall earmark 90 percent of all land-leasing proceeds for infrastructure 
investment. (Federal Negrit Gazeta, 2002)  Municipalities are candid to acknowledge 
that literal budgetary earmarking of this kind does not occur, and cannot occur 
because of the condition of municipal accounting.  However, at least in a sample of 
municipalities empowered with land leasing authority in Amhara and Tigray 
Regional States, growth in municipal land leasing revenues has coincided with a 
                                                           
8 Botswana and Mozambique are other nations that have variants of urban land leasing. 
9 Local governments in Ethiopia are split into an “urban administration” that acts as the local agent for 
the Regional government in providing health and education services and a “municipal” government 
that provides basic services primarily from own resources.   13
growth in total municipal revenues and an increase in the proportion of municipal 
expenditure spent on capital projects. 
 
  The revenue implications of land leasing are summarized in Table 3 for the 
two largest cities in Amhara and Tigray Regions.  The cities have populations 
ranging from 75,000 to 325,000.  Land leasing has become the single largest source 
of municipal revenue, overtaking the traditionally largest source of revenue, the local 
fee and tax items covered in Regional Tariff Proclamations.   By international 
standards, of course, the revenue generated from land leasing in Ethiopia is meager.  
The highest-valued land lease in Mekele, capital of Tigray Region, was sold at 
auction for approximately US$1.60 per square meter.  The infrastructure investments 
being financed are equally basic; they consist of modest upgrades to water 




Revenue from Land Leasing: 
Ethiopia 
Municipalities in Amhara and Tigray 
2003-2004 
 
Municipality Land  Leasing 
As % of Total 
Revenue 
Land Leasing 






Bahir Dar (Amhara)  45.3%  140%  NA 
Gondar (Amhara)  42.3%  105%  35.8% 
Adigrat (Tigray)  21.5%  77%  144.7% 
Mekele (Tigray)  24.2%  81%  8.1% 
a.  Municipalities do not have separate capital budgets; amounts of capital spending are 
estimated from line item expenditures 
b.  The US$/Ethiopian Birr exchange rate was unchanged over 2002/03—2003/04 
Source:  Peterson (2005) 
 
  
The potential exists for further revenue mobilization through land leasing in 
cities where population is growing and municipal management has an 
entrepreneurial mindset. A new municipal administration in Mekele, for example, 
was able to more than double land-leasing revenue in 2004-2005 from the levels 
shown in Table 3, by implementing a policy that sold a larger share of land leases at 
public auction and more aggressively identified undeveloped land parcels for leasing.  
If Ethiopia should succeed in implementing its planned conversion of the annual land 
rent system to up-front leasing, it would further accelerate revenue mobilization, for 
a transitional period. 
   14
  At the same time, land leasing has introduced an unprecedented degree of 
volatility in municipalities’ own-source revenues, especially for mid-sized and 
smaller urban administrations with weaker land markets.  Unable to obtain revenue 
growth from other sources, almost all municipalities have taken the fiscally risky 




  As noted several places in this volume, India long has been troubled by a low 
rate of urban infrastructure investment.  Despite the recognition of urban local bodies 
as a third tier of government by the 74
th constitutional amendment, municipalities 
remain creatures of the states with low revenue-generating capacity, no authority to 
initiate taxes, and with rare exceptions, no power to modify tax rates on their own.  
Responsibility for urban infrastructure investment is scattered among many 
institutions in addition to municipal governments.  Foremost among these in large 
urban areas are Urban Development Authorities (UDAs), which are agencies of the 
states.  Political conflicts at the state level between rural and urban interests have 
limited the volume of resources that state budgets can direct to urban infrastructure 
investment through the UDAs. 
 
  In this environment, institutions have searched for other sources of urban 
infrastructure finance that do not require tax increases or state budget allocations.  
Land resources always have been part of the budgetary picture in India’s cities, but 
they are just beginning to emerge as an important element in infrastructure financing 
strategy. 
 
  UDAs typically are holders of substantial amounts of urban land obtained as 
part of urban development and re-development projects.  In new development areas, 
the UDAs notify land for development, acquire land under public purpose regulation, 
develop an area by installing internal infrastructure networks, sell or rent the land to 
developers and end users, and turn over responsibility for maintenance and operation 
of infrastructure facilities to the municipal government.  In urban re-development 
zones, UDAs carry out similar activities.  The high value of improved land in re-
development projects makes it possible for UDAs to use proceeds from land sale and 
land rental to help finance general urban infrastructure network improvements as 
well as infrastructure specific to the re-development area.   
 
  The Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) 
illustrates this process and the potential for mobilizing infrastructure finance through 
land sales.  In the early 1990s MMRA developed from marshland a 553 acre new 
commercial center called the Bandra-Kurla complex.  Proceeds from the 
development—mostly in the form of annual rent payments and development fees—  15
have provided MMRDA with a capital fund that it has used for a variety of 
initiatives, in addition to infrastructure support for the complex itself. These include 
co-financing a road construction program in greater Mumbai and setting up a 
revolving fund for subsidized infrastructure lending to other municipalities in 
Maharashtra, as well as undesignated contributions to other state initiatives. 
 
  A strategic initiative developed for Mumbai (Bombay First and McKinsey, 
2003) has called attention to the much greater revenue-generating potential of 
MMRDA and other public landholders, if instead of renting land on an annual basis, 
they were to sell fee simple ownership rights.  The proceeds of land sales then could 
be used to finance city-wide infrastructure, as a key part of the strategy for building 
Mumbai into a world-class financial center.   Vision Mumbai identifies land sales as 
one of the most important elements in the public sector’s contribution to 
infrastructure financing. 
 
  The potential for revenue mobilization through land sales has been 
heightened by India’s urban real estate boom.  In January 2006, in two separate 
auctions, the MMRDA sold land parcels in the Bandra-Kurla complex for Rs 22.9 
billion (about US$510 million), including the highest-valued urban land transaction 
recorded to date in India, at roughly US$7,330 per square meter.  MMRDA has said 
it will use the proceeds to finance infrastructure investment.  Table 4 compares the 
revenue mobilization generated by the auction of a few land parcels within this 
single development complex to total annual infrastructure investment by Mumbai 
municipality (Mumbai Municipal Corporation) and other infrastructure financing 
initiatives, including the central government’s first-year contribution to infrastructure 
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Table 4 
Land Sale Revenues and Infrastructure Spending 
Mumbai & India 
 
 
Item  Amount (in Rs millions) 










Total Infrastructure Investment 




Pledge for Mumbai Infrastructure Investment 
By State of Maharashtra 




Central Government Funding  
For Infrastructure Investment and Services to Poor 
In 63 Major Cities, Including Mumbai, 





Note:  One million = 10 crore  
Source:  Data for MMRDA infrastructure spending, Municipal Corporation infrastructure spending, 
and State of Maharashtra pledge: Pathak (2005).  “Infrastructure” investment excludes capital 
spending for education and health. 
 
MMRDA’s revenue mobilization from land sales reflects both the market 
reality of a real estate boom and a change in asset management strategy, away from 
annual rental of land to upfront sale of land properties.  Similar initiatives to realize 
land values and invest the proceeds in infrastructure are being undertaken in other 
parts of urban India.  The poorer state of Rajasthan, for example, announced at the 
beginning of 2006 that it was turning over to the Jaipur Development Authority for 
sale at auction land having a minimum auction price of Rs 5.07 billion (roughly 
US$113 million), a sum that vastly exceeds annual infrastructure investment by all 
levels of government in the capital region of Jaipur.   
 
As urban land sales presently are administered in India, most of the revenue 
proceeds accrue to agencies of state governments, especially the states’ Urban 
Development Authorities.  Land sales thus have not been an instrument of fiscal 
decentralization to the local level or a significant contributor to municipalities’ 
capital budgets.  The large sums generated by land sales have not, in the past, been 
publicly accountable, and often have been treated by the states as off-budget cash 
hoards that can be allocated for any politically attractive purpose.  The new land   17
auctioning guidelines in Rajasthan represent a step forward in this regard.  They 
require that the urban development authority transfer 15 percent of its proceeds from 
land sales to the fiscally impoverished Jaipur Municipal Corporation.  The 
proportions to be transferred to the state government budget and to be retained by the 
UDA for its investment purposes also are specified.  
 
 
Land as a Source of Infrastructure Finance 
 
  The experience reviewed in this chapter suggests that urban land can, under a 
variety of conditions, generate significant amounts of revenue that can help finance 
local infrastructure budgets.  In a growing economy that is urbanizing at a fast pace, 
urban land values will tend to rise strongly over time, although in a highly volatile 
fashion.  Selling land and converting the proceeds into infrastructure assets can make 
sense if it is part of a deliberate policy to accelerate infrastructure investment; based 
on the assessment that infrastructure has become a key bottleneck to economic 
growth and urban service delivery. This was the strategic assessment made in China 
in the early 1990s, and it is the strategy advocated by some analysts and 
policymakers in India today.   
 
  It would be wildly imprudent, of course, to think that urban land values can 
continue to increase at the torrid pace that China, India, and parts of Latin America 
and Africa have experienced from 2002 to 2006.  Counting on further land value 
gains as a major source of financing may also be unwise.  From the perspective of 
strategic asset management, however, the current reality of a real estate boom makes 
it possible to convert publicly held land into publicly valuable infrastructure at an 
especially favorable rate of exchange. 
 
  The impetus to convert land into infrastructure is further strengthened when 
municipalities have few other options for raising discretionary revenues.  The 
countries surveyed here have fiscal frameworks that strictly limit or prohibit local tax 
increases.  Intergovernmental rules and market conditions restrict municipal 
borrowing. It is understandable, then, that authorities should turn to urban land assets 
for financing. This phenomenon is not limited to the developing world.  In the wake 
of Proposition 13 in the State of California (United States), which essentially froze 
local property tax assessments, and related propositions that restricted other forms of 
local tax increases and municipal borrowing, California’s localities also turned to 
land assets as a way to finance infrastructure.  New intergovernmental rules were 
adopted that allowed developers to issue land-based bonds to finance roads, sewer 
and water systems and other basic infrastructure that no longer could be financed by 
the public budget.  Land became the collateral for a good deal of new infrastructure 
financing.  The debt service obligation that developers assumed in order to finance   18
their infrastructure investment became a lien on the land, which purchasers of 
developed parcels acquired along with their property.
10  This lien was enforced by 
municipal governments and billed along with property taxes, but as a legally separate 




  III. FISCAL RISKS AND POLICY CHOICES 
 
  Financing part of urban infrastructure budgets from land sales appears to be 
feasible in countries that either have public ownership of land or institutional 
arrangements that allow special development authorities to acquire and sell land 
associated with infrastructure development projects.  Reliance on land sales for 
revenue, however, creates special risks that need to be taken into account in the 
intergovernmental fiscal framework. 
 
  Linkage between Land Sales and Infrastructure Investment:  In financial 
terms, sale of an income-producing asset closely resembles borrowing.  In both 
cases, up-front payment is received in exchange for a future revenue stream.  The 
foregone revenue stream in the case of asset sales may take the form of recurring 
revenues from user fees, annual land rents, or lost proceeds from the sale of land at a 
future date when it may be more valuable. 
 
  Municipal land and asset sales therefore raise many of the same 
intergovernmental fiscal concerns as municipal borrowing.    One danger involves 
use of the proceeds of asset sales to finance the municipal operating budget.  The 
review in this chapter suggests that some municipalities with access to land-sale 
revenues have come to depend upon these revenues for more than investment 
purposes, and that receipts spill over to become part of the operating budget. The 
fiscal risk is that municipalities become dependent upon asset sales for covering 
recurring costs, and, at a future date, when the assets are gone, face more severe 
budget shortfalls, which they want national government to absorb. 
 
  In the case of borrowing, a common component of fiscal regulation requires 
municipalities to use long-term borrowing only to finance investment.  This Golden 
Rule could similarly apply to asset sales:  municipalities must use the proceeds of 
asset sales to finance investment.  Ethiopia has attempted to follow this approach by 
introducing into its land-leasing proclamation the requirement that 90% of the 
proceeds from municipal land leasing be used for urban infrastructure investment, 
                                                           
10 These are termed Mello-Roos bonds after the authors of the bill that established this mode of 
financing for new community infrastructure.  See California Debt and Investment Advisory 
Commission (2000) and Chapman (1998).   19
and China for a time required that a portion of lease sale revenue be dedicated to 
urban infrastructure construction. Local governments have not applied this rule 
literally in Ethiopia, and, given the fungibility of budgets, it is impossible to ensure 
that asset sales are used to fund incremental investment.  However, the requirement 
to enter asset sales as capital revenue in the capital budget can help maintain the 
policy perspective that one type of asset is being exchanged for another on the 
municipal balance sheet and that land is not being sold to finance operating 
expenses. 
 
  Paradoxically, the Golden Rule limitation would not assist China in 
managing the principal fiscal risks that have arisen there from municipal land sales.  
National authorities fear that municipalities will be too aggressive in using land sales 
to finance investment, and that excessive investment in urban fixed assets will 
contribute to overheating the economy.  To limit such risks, central government has 
resorted to more direct restrictions of the kind used to limit or prohibit municipal 
borrowing.  For a six-month period in 2004, municipal land purchases for urban 
development were halted altogether by central regulation, partly as a fiscal measure 
to restrain excessive local investment.  Central authorities have continued to ban 
municipalities from acquiring land to create new special economic zones or 
industrial parks, out of fear that the practice was stimulating inefficient investment 




Risks of a Real Estate Bubble:   Land prices have the advantage of long-
term buoyancy with respect to economic growth and urbanization.  However, they 
are extremely volatile.  Although at this writing, land prices are rising at a rate of 30-
40% per annum in India’s large cities; they declined over the period 1998-2002 in 
response to the Asian financial crisis and other factors. Hong Kong’s experience 
illustrates the threat to overall fiscal stability that can result from revenue 
dependence on land sales at a time of decline in the real estate market.   
 
The greatest financial risk manifests itself when land and property values 
become the primary basis for borrowing.  Municipal land is the principal collateral 
for borrowing by Chinese municipalities’ Urban Development Investment 
Corporations.  China’s banking system, which has concentrated on cleaning up non-
performing loans, many of them to municipal entities or local State-Owned 
                                                           
11 The Vice-Director of the central government Department of Land Use and Management estimated 
that RMB 200 million (US$25 million) of infrastructure was required to develop each square 
kilometer of an industrial zone.  At that rate, more than RMB 600 billion (US$75 billion) would be 
required to develop only 10 percent of the undeveloped areas municipalities had claimed for 
development zones in 2004.  In the Vice-Director’s words, municipalities’ excesses implied that 
“large sums of money will be ‘buried’ in the soil.” (China Daily 2004 c)   20
Enterprises, would be placed at high risk in the event of a collapse in land or real 
estate prices.  In fact, many of China’s infrastructure-financing policies have 
depended upon continually rising land values for their viability. 
 
Sound fiscal management may require intergovernmental rules that restrict 
the way land values can be used to support municipal borrowing.  One of the first 
steps that China took (in 2003) to restrict land-based municipal borrowing was to 
require that banks making loans for municipal investment appraise land at its current 
market value rather than at its projected value after the completion of infrastructure 
facilities.  Prior to adoption of these controls, it had been common for banks to lend 
against future land values.  This exposed their lending both to project risk—the risk 
that the proposed new special economic zone or new urban center would not be 
completed as proposed—and to political risk.  The close ties between the local 
branches of state banks and local political authorities made it possible to incorporate 
highly optimistic, or speculative, projections of future land values as the basis for 
lending. 
 
The State of California, in passing legislation that permitted municipalities to 
authorize developers to finance infrastructure through land-based bonds recognized 
the risk that developer projects would not be completed as proposed and required 
that land used to collateralize bonds have a current market value appraisal of at least 
three times the principal amount of debt issued. 
 
   The Entrepreneurial Municipality:  Incentives and Distortions 
 
  In the end, the greatest challenge to the intergovernmental fiscal system lies 
in deciding how much entrepreneurial freedom to grant municipalities as land market 
players and how much importance to assign to municipal infrastructure investment 
vs. the claims of other potential beneficiaries of municipal land value increases. 
 
  Mobilizing large amounts of infrastructure financing from land sales requires 
a motivated, entrepreneurial municipality that has freedom of action to assemble land 
parcels, sell them at market prices, and keep most of the profits for investment.  The 
land market is not an ordinary competitive market, however.  Municipalities have 
potential monopolistic power over land supply, and local governments and land 
development agencies are likely to have far more political power at their command 
than farmers, rural communes, poor households, and small businesses from whom 
the municipality acquires land.  This imbalance lies at the heart of intergovernmental 
regulatory rules that are needed to define and constrain municipal governments as 
players in the local land market.  Rules not only define how far municipalities can go 
in generating land profits, but they indirectly define how far the intergovernmental 
system will go in making a priority of municipal infrastructure investment.  The land   21
value gains that municipalities use to finance infrastructure investment also are 
claimed by farmers, who demand that they should receive market value for the land 
taken from them, by the poor, who demand adequate compensation and replacement 
housing in return for mandatory re-settlement, as well as by private developers and 
others. 
 
   China and India represent different starting points in defining the 
intergovernmental rules that allocate benefits from land appreciation.  China started 
by assigning virtually all power over land acquisition and land disposition to 
municipalities.  This assignment of institutional power allowed municipalities to 
move virtually unchecked to convert land rights into infrastructure assets.  More 
recently, resistance from farmers and the poor has forced government—first 
individual municipalities (Zhu 2004), then the national government—to adopt 
regulations that increase compensation levels, introduce hearing procedures to 
strengthen the rights of parties whose land is being taken, and prohibit municipalities 
from acquiring or re-developing certain types of land without express authorization 
of higher-level governmental authorities.  These steps have slowed somewhat the 
pace of municipalities’ land-to-infrastructure conversion, though many conflicts over 
municipal land acquisition remain unresolved. 
 
  India started with rules that placed more obstacles in the path of 
municipalities and development agencies that wanted to mobilize investment 
financing through land acquisition and land sale.  In Mumbai, residents of Dharavi, 
the largest slum in East Asia, won the right, if registered before 1995, to have new 
housing provided for them free of charge in the same area as part of any 
redevelopment project.  Newer residents have exerted political pressure for 
comparable compensation.  This protection has meant that public profits from re-
development and land sales in Dharavi will be channeled primarily to housing for the 
poor rather than city-wide infrastructure.  Other restrictions direct India’s urban 
development authorities to provide land at the urban fringe to middle-class applicants 
at highly subsidized rates, not at market rates that would generate a profit available 
for investment. Such restrictions have made it difficult to mobilize surplus financing 
through land sales and target it to infrastructure improvements.  In the last three 
years, however, Mumbai has, with great publicity, launched a redevelopment effort 
expressly designed to emulate Shanghai’s development.  The initiative focuses on re-
development of publicly held land, and proposes to generate financing for general 
infrastructure in part by claiming a greater share of the revenue generated by land 
sales for public investment. 
 
  As long as urban land prices continue to rise, institutional conflict over how 
to allocate the benefits of land value gains will continue, and likely intensify.  
Municipal infrastructure investment is one claimant for increased funding, but it   22
must compete with the demands of social groups that have a stake in urban land and 
land values.  Whenever large sums of money are generated by off-budget 
transactions, there also is the potential for political wastefulness and corruption.  
Clear institutional accounting for the revenues generated by land sales and the uses 
of funds, whether for infrastructure or other purposes, is the first step toward 
responsible management of increasingly valuable urban land assets. 
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